Perhaps...Perhaps Not

By Michael S. Rozeff

“North Korea has successfully produced a miniaturized nuclear warhead that can fit inside its missiles, according to a confidential July assessment from the Defense Intelligence Agency…”

I do not believe this. Why believe a one-sentence conclusion that’s leaked to the Washington Post? The Post is a CIA vehicle. Why believe some unknown intelligence source with no other information to back it up? Why believe this when such leaks are used to manipulate public opinion at critical junctures? If such important information is for real, why would it be made public via a leak? Why not come out in the open? Why not inform members of Congress and have them release it? Come out of the shadows and speak like a man. I refuse to credit people who hide in the dark, shooting forth their documents and expecting us to believe them and dance to their tune. If members of government cannot make a supportable case in public, why should I listen, much less believe? Government is supposed to be transparent.

The detailed information that we have from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists does not allow us to conclude that N. Korea has an ICBM and an atomic warhead atop it that can hit the lower 48. That is further reason for thinking that N. Korea does not have an operational miniaturized atomic bomb deliverable by an ICBM to this country.

In a few years, N. Korea might attain the capability. We’d probably see some tests that showed they had it for sure.

I will believe that they have this capability now if the U.S. has penetrated their computer systems and/or has some spies on the ground or hard information that this is the case. But the available news is that the U.S. does not now have such spies. On May 8, 2017 it was reported that a spy unit was being formed for exactly that task. The U.S. has used aerial surveillance as a rule.

Failing direct knowledge of what N. Korea has accomplished, and knowing of the poor record of our intelligence agencies in other important instances such as the Russian economy, and knowing of their political biases, and knowing of their incentive to err on the side of inflating risks, I am staying with my belief that at this time N. Korea couldn’t come close to Seattle with an atomic device.

Regardless of N. Korean weaponry, safety of Americans and prevention of atomic wars are very important objectives. To attain them, the U.S. needs to negotiate and be willing to end its security pact with S. Korea. This is not appeasement, but it does signal the beginning of the end of the U.S. empire. That’s why it will be strongly resisted by the national security state. We will be told that appeasement is present and that it makes us less safe. This is absolutely not the case. Getting out of trouble spots with which the involvement makes us an atomic target makes us safer.

What should therefore be crystal clear is that the desire of the national security state to maintain and extend the U.S. empire directly conflicts with the twin aims of the safety of Americans and no atomic wars.

posted by ΛΕΟΝΙΔΑΣ